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provocation in mitigation of actual or compensatory damages. 20
The leading case in these decisions is Robison v. Rupert,21 in which
the Pennsylvania court said that if there were a reasonable excuse for the defendant arising from the fault of the plaintiff but
not enough to entirely" justify the act there can be no exemplary
damages and the circumstances of mitigation must be applied to
the actual damages. Provocation and malice on the defendant's
part are punished by awarding damages exceeding the measure
of compensation, and on the plaintiff's part by giving him less
than that measure.
Despite the contrary holding at common law, there is much
to be said in favor of the Louisiana theory which denies recovery
to the person who provokes the attack by abusive languages. A
person must come into court with clean hands and if both parties
are at fault neither of the two wrongdoers can recover. The principal case, Manuel v. Ardoin, reiterates that rule, and affirms a,
wholesome trend in Louisiana decisions to treat insulting words
as sufficient fault to bar a recovery.
E.P.C.

PROPERTY INSURANc--WHEN INTEREST IN PROPERTY MUST ExIST-A and B, jointly owning a residence, obtained a fire policy.

Later A sold B her one-half interest in the residence covered by
the policy, but made no special assignment of the policy to B.
Upon destruction of the residence by fire, A contended that in absence of a special assignment of the policy she retained her interest in the policy, and one-half of its benefits inured to her. In
an interpleader suit, the lower court so held and B appealed. Held,
for B. The court reiterated the general rule that, to recover on a
fire insurance policy, one must have an insurable interest at the
time of the inception of the policy and also at the time the loss
occurs. Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Harp, 203 La.
806, 14 So.(2d) 643 (1943).
That the insured must have an insurable interest in the subject matter of the policy is a cardinal principle of insurance law.
"A person has an insurable interest in property when he sustains
20. Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N.Y. 324, 40 Am. St. Rep. 543 (1881); Genung v.
Baldwin, 77 App. Dtv. 584, 79 N. Y. Supp. 569 (1902).
21. 23 Pa. 523 (1854).
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NOTES

such relations with respect to it that he has a reasonable expectation, resting upon a basis of legal right, of benefit to be derived
from its continued existence, or of loss or liability from its destruction."' The question arises-When must the insurable interest
exist? That is, need the insured only have an insurable interest
at the inception of the policy, or at the time of the loss of the
property, or must he have an insurable interest both at the inception of the policy and at the time of the loss?
The few Louisiana cases in point have uniformly stated that
the insured must have an insurable interest both at the inception
2
of the policy and at the time of the loss of the thing insured.
Where the claimant owned the property at the time the insurance was taken but subsequently disposed of or was relieved of
his interest in the property prior to the loss, the Louisiana courts
have denied his right to share in the insurance proceeds., Such
was the actual holding in the principal case. Conversely, following the rule stated in our Louisiana cases, it seems the court
would hold that, if one had an insurable interest at the time of
the loss of the property, but had no interest at the inception of
the policy, he would not be allowed a recovery. No case directly
in point has been found, and this converse proposition thus appears as dictum. However, the consistency of its repetition would
1. Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance (2 ed. 1930) 124, § 50.
2. Power v. Ocean Insurance Co., 19 La. 28, 30, 31 (1841); Bell v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 3 Rob. 423, 426 (La. 1843); Marcuse v. Upton, 9 La. App.
28, 30, 118 So. 790, 791 (1928); Davis-Wood Lbr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 154 So. 760, 764 (La. App. 1934).
3. Macarty v. Commercial Ins. Co., 17 La. 365 (1841). Plaintiff had a
policy covering a house and kitchen for one year, both being destroyed within that time. Prior to destruction, the insured had made a donation inter
vivos of the property. The court held there was no insurable interest at the
time of the loss as the loss would fall on the donee.
Bell v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 3 Rob. 423 (La. 1843). Plaintiff insured
a boat and later sold it, taking notes in payment, secured by a mortgage.
The boat was destroyed by fire. Held, the plaintiff, being neither owner nor
privileged creditor when the boat burned, he had no insurable interest and
could not claim the loss.
Pike v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 505 (1874). A, by agreement with B, was to insure a steamer. A insured the steamer and transferred
the policy to B. Upon A's nonpayment, B paid for the policy. A fraudulently
sold his interest in the steamer acquired from B and it fell into the hands
of a United States marshal. The steamer was destroyed. Held, B had no insurable interest after the marshal's sale and therefore had no right to the
proceeds.
Marcuse v. Upton, 9 La. App. 28, 118 So. 790 (1928). The defendant sold
his one-half interest in property covered by a policy, the sale being prior to
the destruction of the property by fire. Held, a party loses all title or interest
in a policy the instant he parts with ownership or interest in the thing insured, and has no longer any interest in the policy susceptible of assignment by him.
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make it rather difficult for the Louisiana court subsequently to
adopt a different view.
It may be well to analyze carefully the logic of our judicial
statements that to recover on a fire insurance policy "one must
have an insurable interest at the time of the inception of the
policy and also at the time the loss occurs." The requisite of insurable interest at the inception of the policy appears to serve
no sound or substantial purpose. The important considerations
appear to be that the insured must have obtained the policy in
good faith and must have a real interest at the time of the loss.
The necessity of an interest at the time of the loss would eliminate the possibility of using the insurance policy as a device for
wagering or gaming. If the insured has no interest at the time of
the loss, recovery is impossible. If the insured has such an interest, he has met the requirement and there is no need for denying
recovery. This view would permit one to insure property which
he contemplated buying at a subsequent date, the risk attaching
at the time of the purchase or when an interest is acquired.
Professor Vance, the leading modern authority on insurance
law, admits that the books and reports are full of judicial statements requiring an insurable interest both at the inception of
the policy and at the time of the loss, but states that this is a
minority view. Vance adequately expresses the majority rule:
"In order that insurance on property shall be valid, an
interest must exist in the insured at the time of the loss. It
is not necessary that an interest shall exist at the time of the
issue of the policy, provided the parties intend that the risk
shall attach only when an interest accrues to the insured;
nor, in the absence of an express provision to that effect, does
the suspension of the insured's interest during the currency
of the policy defeat a recovery if an interest has been reacquired before the loss occurs."'
Insofar as Louisiana jurisprudence requires an insurable interest at the inception of the policy, as well as at the time of the
loss, it goes further than either logic, modem authority, or actual
judicial decisions justify.
J.N. H.
4. Vance, op. cit. supra note 1, at 143, § 51. Power v. Ocean Insurance
Co., 19 La. 28 (1841), In accord on the proposition that a temporary suspension of the interest does not preclude recovery, if the insured has an Interest
at the time of the loss.

